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Abstract 
Mongolia’s transition away from the monobank system in the 1990s did not occur 
smoothly, with inherited, non-performing loans from the monobank period causing 
significant instability and insolvency in the banking sector. These inherited portfolios, in 
conjunction with risky lending by the newly formed banking sector, led to the insolvency of 
People’s Bank (also known as Ardyn Bank), and Insurance Bank, which together held 
approximately 35% of total assets in the banking system. From 1996 to 1997, the 
Mongolian government, with the technical and financial support of the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank, formed the Mongolian Asset Recovery Agency (MARA) to remove 
nonperforming loans from the banking sector as well as to liquidate the People’s and 
Insurance Banks. MARA attempted to achieve this through the purchase of nonperforming 
loans in exchange for interest-bearing government bonds. MARA’s stated goal was to 
recover 90% of the nonperforming loans, as well as to create a more normalized financial 
culture of fulfilling contractual debt obligations. Initially, MARA intended to be functional 
for a three-year period, but further insolvency crises required MARA to stay open longer 
than three years. By 2000, MARA had recovered only 14% of the initial $35 million in 
assets that it seized in 1997 from the two liquidated banks that sparked the need for MARA.  
Keywords: Mongolia, asset management companies, asset purchase programs, MARA, 
nonperforming loans, broad-based asset management 
  
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs. 
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financial-crises/. 






At a Glance  
In 1991, Mongolia dissolved its pure 
monobank system, dividing the state-owned 
bank into six different enterprises including 
the central bank (Enoch, Gulde, and Hardy 
2002). The five major commercial banks that 
emerged from the monobank system 
inherited a portfolio of nonperforming loans 
that had been made to state-owned 
enterprises when Mongolia had a central 
economy, which accounted for about 20% of 
total loans. Beyond the inherited loans, more 
than half of the new loans made after the 
transition away from the monobank system 
were considered “problem loans,” as banks 
continued to loan to loss-making businesses 
in the hopes of recovering some funds and 
capitalized interest on nonperforming loans 
in order to disguise their losses. By the mid-
1990s, the five commercial banks in 
Mongolia accounted for 90% of total banking 
sector assets (Asian Development Bank 
1996). Some of the smaller, minor banks 
failed and required takeovers by the larger 
banks in 1994. However, these failures likely 
did not solely cause the deterioration of the 
Mongolian banking system, since the small 
banks made up such an insignificant portion 
of the system (Enoch, Gulde, and Hardy 
2002). 
Of the five major banks, only one of them, T&D Bank, managed to reach the liquidity ratio 
requirement established by the Bank of Mongolia in June of 1996. Of the remaining 
commercial banks in 1996, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) determined that the 
financial stability of People’s Bank, also known as Ardyn Bank, and Insurance Bank was 
most in question, as they were insolvent and in blatant violation of prudential regulations. 
About 57% of loans made by People’s Bank were nonperforming, and Insurance Bank 
maintained just enough reserves for loan losses of less than 4% of its noninherited loan 
portfolio. The ADB determined that substituting interest-bearing government securities for 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: To hold the nonperforming assets of 
banks, to attempt to recover as much of them as 
possible and to “set an example of financial 
discipline and the enforcement of loan contracts” 
(Enoch, Gulde, and Hardy 2002). 
Launch dates Announcement: December 
1996 
First transfer: January 1997 
Wind-down dates Unknown 
Size and type of 
NPL problem 
42.2% of total bank loans 
A mix of inherited monobank 
loans and new problem loans 
Program size Not specified at outset 
Eligible 
institutions 
Two liquidated commercial 
banks 
Closed bank  
Usage Initial plan transferred about 
$35 million in assets to MARA 
Outcomes About 14% of the initial debt 




Government agency, then a 
government department, and 
finally a state-owned 
enterprise 
Notable features Mongolian authorities 
provided MARA with 
expedited access to the courts 
Mongolian Asset Recovery Agency (MARA) 
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the inherited nonperforming loans would not fix People’s Bank and Insurance Bank, since 
they faced larger problems than a simple restructuring could handle (Asian Development 
Bank 1996). 
To restore confidence and stability to the banking system, the government of Mongolia, in 
accordance with advice from the World Bank and the ADB, decided to assume 
responsibility for the nonperforming loans, while liquidating People’s Bank and Insurance 
Bank. These institutions would not be recapitalized and instead would enter receivership 
in December 1996, with three separate new institutions emerging from receivership (Asian 
Development Bank 1996). These institutions were Savings Bank, which handled secure 
household deposits; Reconstruction Bank, which provided banking services to former 
business customers and other entities in the failed banks, and the Mongolian Asset 
Recovery Agency (MARA), which would purchase nonperforming loans from the receiver of 
the two liquidated banks in return for restructuring bonds. In order for MARA to purchase 
the nonperforming assets and capitalize the new banks, the government utilized funds 
from a $35 million Financial Sector Program Loan (FSPL) from the ADB to replace the 
assets with government securities. The receiver would then transfer the bonds to either the 
Savings Bank or the Reconstruction Bank. The World Bank stated that the “FSPL will 
finance the recapitalization of the banking sector” (World Bank 1997). 
The Mongolian government established MARA as a government agency under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Finance, rather than as an incorporated public enterprise to project 
governmental authority (Enoch, Gulde, and Hardy 2002). The government initially 
intended for MARA to exist for three years and recover 90% of the nonperforming assets 
transferred to them within that time period (World Bank 1997). Despite this stated 
optimism, other analysis of the program did not expect MARA to recover much from the 
nonperforming assets since many of the borrowing enterprises no longer existed (Enoch, 
Gulde, and Hardy 2002).  
Of the $35 million in liquidated assets seized by MARA in 1997, the World Bank estimated 
that MARA recovered about 14% of it after three years (World Bank 2002). However, an 
IMF analysis of MARA concluded that the overall recovery rate was closer to 17% (Enoch, 
Gulde, and Hardy 2002).  
Summary Evaluation 
There has not been much evaluation of MARA, but a 2000 report from the World Bank 
indicates that MARA’s “ability to recover nonperforming assets is hampered by its 
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Mongolian Asset Recovery Agency: Mongolia Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$1.346 billion in 1996 
$1.181 billion in 1997 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, Nominal GDP in LCU converted to 
USD) 
$580.91 in 1996 
$505.59 in 1997 
Sovereign credit rating (5-year senior debt) 
 
Data not available for 1996 
Data not available for 1997  
Size of banking system 
 
Data not available for 1996 
Data not available for 1997  
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
 
Data not available for 1996 
Data not available for 1997  
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
 
Data not available for 1996 
Data not available for 1997  
5-bank concentration of banking system 
 
90% of total banking assets in 1996 
Foreign involvement in banking system 
Data not available for 1996 
Data not available for 1997  
Government ownership of banking system 
Data not available for 1996 
Data not available for 1997  
Existence of deposit insurance 
No deposit insurance system 
established in Mongolia at this time 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank 
Deposit Insurance Dataset; Asian Development Bank 1996. 
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Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a package: Mongolia established MARA along with two other institutions, 
Savings Bank and Reconstruction Bank, to stabilize the banking system after the 
liquidation of two banks that accounted for almost half of the system.  
Following the liquidation of People’s and Insurance Banks, the government created three 
institutions: MARA (for nonperforming assets), Savings Bank (which could only invest in 
safe assets and hold household deposits), and Reconstruction Bank (which could only 
provide banking services to businesses with deposits in the failed banks). The government 
issued government bonds to Savings Bank and Reconstruction Bank to replace the bad 
assets and contribute to their initial capital. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) provided a 
$35 million Financial Sector Program Loan (FSPL) to capitalize the new banks (World Bank 
1997).  
2. Legal authority: The Speaker’s Decree No. 104 of December 11, 1996, liquidated 
the People’s and Insurance Banks, while the Ministry of Finance and Economy 
(MOFE) Order No. 17 on January 11, 1997, established MARA. 
The government decrees and orders establishing MARA do not appear to be available 
digitally. The government developed the plan for the creation and activities of MARA in 
conjunction with the Asian Development Bank (Asian Development Bank 1996). 
Additionally, the Law of Mongolia on Banking, passed in 1996, established the process 
through which receivership would occur.3 The law allowed the Bank of Mongolia to pursue 
receivership if the appointment of a conservator had failed to regulate the behavior of the 
bank or if the bank had become insolvent (Parliament of Mongolia 1996). The law 
required the receiver to arrange for the assets of the bank to be assumed by others, while 
ensuring that depositors received first priority among creditors (Parliament of Mongolia 
1996).  
3. Special powers: Mongolian authorities provided MARA with expedited access to 
the courts.  
MARA technically received “expedited access to the courts, having its cases heard by judges 
who are specialists in this field of law” (World Bank 1997). However, the courts and 
individual judges did not typically understand the legitimacy of MARA to claim 
nonperforming assets on behalf of the Ministry of Finance. Judges also had a weak 
understanding of these transactions in general, since the two-tier banking system had 
existed for only seven years since the breakup of the monobank system (Bold Magvan, 
email message to author, March 14, 2021).4 
 
3 Unofficial English translation of this law by Lehman Law can be found at http://lehmanlaw.mn/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Banking1996.pdf. 
4 Bold Magvan was the Deputy Governor of the Bank of Mongolia from 1996-2000. 
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4. Mandate: MARA’s mandate was to minimize losses and utilize the Mongolian 
legal system to pursue delinquent borrowers in order to normalize contractual 
obligations. 
While MARA initially set out with a defined goal of recovering 90% of assets transferred to 
it in the first three years, this was not the sole mandate of MARA (World Bank 1997). 
According to an IMF Research Paper, the goal of MARA was “not only to minimize the cost 
of the bank restructuring operation, but also to set an example of financial discipline and 
the enforcement of loan contracts.” MARA attempted to rebuild confidence in the banking 
sector through the litigation of defaulting borrowers through the legal system of Mongolia 
(Enoch, Gulde, and Hardy 2002). The agency also attempted to actively restructure 
delinquent enterprises, but achieved little success due to the limited capacity of MARA and 
the politicization of its activities.  
5. Ownership structure: MARA initially began as a government agency, but later 
became a department within the Ministry of Finance and Economy and then a 
state-owned enterprise.  
Initially, officials had proposed to make MARA an incorporated public enterprise because 
that structure would allow the asset management agency to maintain a nonpolitical 
categorization. Additionally, MARA hired staff from the liquidated banks with 
performance-based contracts, which would assimilate easier into a public enterprise. 
However, Mongolian authorities created MARA as a government agency, since they 
desired MARA to carry governmental standing in order to provide stability to the banking 
sector (Enoch, Gulde, and Hardy 2002).  
In 2000, MARA transitioned into the “Asset Recovery Department” within the Ministry of 
Finance (KDI and KOICA 2004). In 2002, Government Resolution 109 transformed MARA 
from a government agency into a state-owned enterprise (Minister of Finance and 
Economy 2002). 
6. Governance/administration: MARA functioned under the Ministry of Finance 
and Economy. 
There is no further publicly available information on the internal organizational structure 
of MARA, nor annual reports or audits.  
7. Size: There did not appear to be a set cap on the size of MARA. 
The government initially provided 21 billion Mongolian tugriks ($29.4 million) in 
government bonds to MARA at its creation to cover the nonperforming assets of the failed 
banks (World Bank 1997). 
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8. Funding sources: MARA acquired assets from the receiver of the two liquidated 
banks in return for interest-bearing government bonds using funds from the 
ADB. 
The ADB provided a $35 million FSPL to Mongolia to finance the banking sector 
restructuring (World Bank 1997). The receiver sold all of the assets of the liquidated 
banks to MARA in return for interest-bearing government restructuring bonds, which 
MARA financed with the FSPL funds. The receiver then transfered the deposits of the 
liquidating banks, as well as the restructuring bonds, to the Savings and Restructuring 
Banks. Finally, MARA sold “liquid and fixed assets and performing loans” to the other two 
successor institutions against cash and bonds (Asian Development Bank 1996).5  
The restructuring bonds were issued with a maturity of one month, with government 
assurances that they would be rolled over continuously. The interest rate on the bonds 
was slightly higher than the interest rate set by the Bank of Mongolia, which hovered 
around 4% for 1997. The bonds were nonnegotiable and available only to banks (Enoch, 
Gulde, and Hardy 2002). 
9. Eligible institutions: MARA purchased assets from liquidated banks that the 
government was in the process of restructuring.  
While MARA was created as a direct response to the insolvency and liquidation of the 
People’s and Insurance Banks, its activities were not limited to just those institutions. 
MARA later took on the following failed banks: Reconstruction Bank (which was created 
alongside MARA), HOTSH Bank and Central Asia Bank (KDI and KOICA 2004).6 It is unclear 
if MARA followed a set criteria for eligible institutions, whether private or public. 
10. Eligible Assets: MARA assumed all of the non-performing assets of the two failed 
banks. 
MARA did not seem to place a restriction on which assets could be obtained. About 70% of 
the non-performing assets assumed by MARA in 1997 were small to medium sized loans 
to individuals. The other 30% of assets were defaulted loans to enterprises for large 
investment projects, which the World Bank cites as requiring “extensive loan workout” 
(World Bank 1997). 
11. Acquisition mechanics: The People’s and Insurance Banks were forcibly 
liquidated and their assets seized by the government. 
While the two failed banks were closed without warning; there is no documentation for 
how the directed and inherited loans in the nonliquidated commercial banks were taken 
 
5 Some references state that the government assumed responsibility for all of the inherited and directed loans 
in the banking system, including those in institutions not being liquidated (World Bank 1997). However, it is 
not clear if those loans were placed into MARA or simple assumed by the government. 
6 It is not clear if Mongolia considered the bankruptcies of these banks to be the result of the same crisis that 
necessitated the creation of MARA. 
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over by MARA.7 However, an IMF research paper states that the government accepted 
responsibility for these loans and acquiesced to swapping bonds for the directed and 
inherited loans, which amounted to about $11 million by the end of 1996 (Enoch, Gulde, 
and Hardy 2002). 
12. Acquisition pricing: It is uncertain how MARA and the Mongolian government 
priced the non-performing assets. 
There is no information available on specific pricing strategies used to assess and assume 
the nonperforming assets.  
13. Recovery and disposal: MARA planned to utilize several strategies to recover 
loans, which the agency intended to establish financial discipline and not simply 
minimize losses. 
The stated goal of MARA was to maximize recovery of the nonperforming loans received 
from the failed banks. This goal included providing financial discipline and normalizing 
loan contract enforcement within the Mongolian financial system, rather than simply 
minimizing losses. MARA could utilize the following techniques for recovering loans: 
“netting loans against deposits, renegotiating loans, seizing collateral, and initiating 
bankruptcy proceedings” (Enoch, Gulde, and Hardy 2002). MARA never implemented its 
ability to initiate bankruptcy proceedings.  
According to a World Bank report from 1997, MARA intended to create a “Bulk Sales 
Program,” in which moderate-size loans would be packaged together and sold to 
individual investors rather than commercial banks at a significant discount. About 70% of 
the nonperforming assets assumed by MARA in 1997 were from small to medium-size 
loans to individuals, which made the Bulk Sales Program more attractive than individual 
sales. After the completion of the Bulk Sales Program, MARA intended to seek to delegate 
the remainder of the loan recovery efforts to commercial banks, through the creation of a 
secondary market created by the government (World Bank 1997). This secondary market 
was never created, and it is unclear if the Bulk Sales program ever materialized.  
As a state-owned enterprise in 2002, MARA was allowed to sell recovered assets at a 
discount, through an auction process (World Bank 2005). 
14.  Timeframe: MARA initially had a definite timeframe of three years, but further 
banking failures necessitated an extension.  
An initial report on the Mongolian banking sector restructuring stated that MARA had a 
three-year lifespan when created, with the hopes of transitioning debt recovery duties to 
commercial banks (World Bank 1997). However, the creation of MARA did not result in a 
 
7 The closing of the failed banks required 900 agents to simultaneously enter 100 branches at the close of 
business on Friday, December 13, 1996, to prevent any destruction of records. On Monday, the branches of 
the People’s Bank reopened as the Savings Bank, while Insurance Bank became the Reconstruction Bank 
(Enoch, Gulde, and Hardy 2002). 
327
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 2
  
fully healthy and stable banking system, as other banks began to fail. This development 
was expected at the time, since the Mongolian government did not have the funds 
available to liquidate all of the insolvent banks at once. This included the Reconstruction 
Bank, which was intended to facilitate enterprise deposits originally in the People’s and 
Insurance Banks (KDI and KOICA 2004). As a result of this, MARA existed in its various 
forms until at least 2005 (World Bank 2005). 
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